Volume 13
Issue 3 Summer 1973
Summer 1973

The Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program: A Consideration of
Economic Efficiency and Equity
Charles J. Cicchetti
Willian J. Gillen

Recommended Citation
Charles J. Cicchetti & Willian J. Gillen, The Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program: A Consideration of
Economic Efficiency and Equity, 13 Nat. Resources J. 399 (1973).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol13/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

natural resources iournal
Published four times a year by The University of New Mexico School of Law
Vol. 13

July 1973

No. 3

THE MANDATORY OIL IMPORT
QUOTA PROGRAM: A CONSIDERATION OF
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY*
by
CHARLES J. CICCHETTI**
and
WILLIAN J. GILLEN...
Oil import quota schemes have been a subject of controversy
among policy makers and economists alike for at least two decades. A
landmark in the controversy is the Report of the Cabinet Task Force
on Oil Import Control, issued in February 1970. At the time the
Report was issued, however, the controversy was somewhat muted by
events abroad which increased the cost of imported oil and thus
reduced the price differential between imported and domestic oil.
The closing of the Suez Canal, the disruption of oil flowing through a
pipeline in Syria, oil embargoes in North Africa and a united
negotiating front by the Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
all contributed to increased transportation and other costs for
imported oil. As a result, domestic oil supplies became more
attractive and the impact of the import quota system diminished.
These influences, however, were basically short-lived and more
recently have been countered by other factors which are reducing
uncertainty and tending to restore equilibrium in the international
petroleum industry. World tanker tariffs are stabilizing. Contracts
*The research for this paper was carried out in response to a request from the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. It was supported in part by the Environmental
Defense Fund and Resources for the Future. The authors would like to thank Mrs. Jean Arnold
of the University of Wisconsin, Social Systems Research Institute for the preparation of this
manuscript. A special thanks is reserved for Mr. Jerry Jasinowski for his patience and
encouragement.
As this paper goes to press the President has announced a sweeping change in the
quantitative restrictions on crude oil and replaced these with a free system while holding open
the possibility of reinstating quantitative controls. This paper should serve as a guide of the cost
to those who seek to reinstate such a program for national security or any other purposes.
"Visiting Associate Professor of Economics and Environmental Studies, University of
Wisconsin.
"'Research Associate, Environmental Defense Fund, Washington, D.C.
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have been signed between the petroleum industry and Oil Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) which establish prices that will prevail
until 1975.1 While Alaskan oil fields (which are at the center of their
own controversy) seem closer to development, reasonable projections
of demand for petroleum products exceed even this considerable
increase in domestic supply. Our attention is again drawn to foreign
sources of supply; the effect of an import quota becomes more
apparent, more acute, and more deserving of renewed examination.
This paper will first review the historical development of the
Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program and describe the manner in
which it presently functions. Second, it will review several analyses
made during and shortly after the Cabinet Task Force Report, and
update these to reflect changing market conditions. Finally, the paper
will analyze the equity and efficiency aspects of the present program
in the context of its objectives, and consider alternative means of
achieving those objectives.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE2
The first U.S. experience with oil import quotas was in the 1930's
under the National Industrial Recovery Act. Although the Act was
declared unconstitutional in 1935, the competitive position of the
United States was such that the U.S. was a net exporter of oil until
1948. By 1955 that position had eroded-due largely to major oil finds
in Venezuela and the Middle East-and a Cabinent Advisory Committee recommended the use of voluntary oil import restraints to maintain the 1954 ratio of imports to domestic production. 3 The Office
of Defense Mobilization thereupon established the "First Voluntary
Program" and requested oil companies to reduce imports from
outside the Western Hemisphere by 7%. This program failed to
prevent an increase in net imports as a number of companies began to
import for the first time. 4
In 1957, the informal program was repaced by the "The Voluntary
Program." This program set import quotas for four petroleum districts
(I to IV). District V was exempted from control (see figure 1). Three
classes of importers were designated:
1. Actually posted prices, whose meaning we will define below were established. The actual
prices paid for foreign oil are treated secretly by the exporting country and the petroleum
industry. Therefore, for the purposes of determining royalty payments and taxes, a posted price
is negotiated and used by the parties involved.
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical, legal and political aspects of the
Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program, see, Dam, Implementation of Import Quotas: The Case of
Oil, 14 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1971). Section I is based in large part on Dam's important study.
3. Report of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control 3 (Feb. 1970). [hereinafter cited
as Report].
4. See Dam, supra note 2, at 6.
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1) importers (established, larger volume importers)
2) small importers (lower volume importers with no existing
record of imports prior to 1954)
3) newcomers (firms with no existing record of imports)
The allocation of quotas among classes was basically historical. This
aspect of the program was significant in two respects. First, itwas
carried over (with modification) to the Mandatory Oil Import
Program. Second, it contributed to the collapse of The Voluntary
Program.
Whether any voluntary quota program could succeed, no matter
what its form and structure, is a matter of speculation; but an
essential element is that the participants in the program, i.e., the
importers and potential importers, should regard the allocation of
quotas as generally equitable. 5 Is an historical allocation equitable?
Quota allocations are highly profitable to those who possess them.
Quota allocations to historical importers are, in fact, rewards to
persons for having imported oil when there was no restriction on its
importation. For that situation to be regarded as fair or just one would
5. It is also desirable that they respect the objectives of the program, and believe the
program reasonably capable of achieving those ends. This is a question of program efficiency,
which we defer for consideration under the Mandatory Program.
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want a statement, sanctioned in law, that it was public policy to show
preference to that select group. Of course, no such preference is
supposed to exist. Moreover it is not the case that alternative
allocation procedures are impossible-or even difficult-to conceive.
For example, quotas might be allocated according to refinery
capacity, or willingness to pay for the privelege of importing, with
revenues going to the general tax base rather than oil company profits.
One can only conclude that allocation of quotas according to
historical levels of imports by specific firms is arbitrary, inequitable,
and constitutes an inherent weakness of both the voluntary program
and its immediate successor the Mandatory Program.
The Voluntary Program survived until 1959. Dam, previously cited,
notes four reasons for the breakdown of the Voluntary Program:
1) Noncompliance. The Voluntary Program had no enforcement
mechanism 6 and simple noncompliance was widespread.
2) Newcomers. Any quota system sets up a two-price system, i.e.,
domestic and foreign. The more effective the quota, the greater the
attraction of the foreign-priced commodity. Firms without import
allocation duly responded: Requests from "newcomers" for quota
allocations, plus requests for increased allocations for existing importers would have more than doubled their current imports.
3) Products. The Voluntary Import Program applied only to crude
oil. Products refined from crude oil were not controlled. One would
expect importers to avoid the quota by shifting the refined products
instead of crude oil; as indeed they did. Residual fuel oil imports
quadrupled between 1956 and 1958. Imports of unfinished oils
increased 6700% from 1957 to 1958.
4) Antitrust. The Voluntary Program was said to be in disfavor
within the Justice Department Antitrust Division. One company even
offered fear of violating the antitrust laws as a basis for noncompliance.
THE MANDATORY OIL IMPORT QUOTA PROGRAM
In 1959, by presidential proclamation, the Voluntary Program was
replaced by the Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program. 7 The
Mandatory Program was established on the grounds "that crude oil
and the principal crude oil derivatives and products are being
imported in such quantities and under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security." 8 The threat sought to be
eliminated was-and continues to be-a dependence of the United
6. The Buy America Act was invoked with respect to suppliers to the U.S. Government, but
was not an unqualified success.
7. Presidential Proclamation 3279, reprinted in Report, supra note 3, at 197.
8. Id.
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States on foreign oil supplies such that the United States might be left
without adequate domestic supplies should those foreign supplies for
any reason cease to be available. Given restricted imports the
domestic oil industry would thus be encouraged to locate and develop
domestic supplies. A corollary purpose was "to prevent imports from
causing a decline in the petroleum sector of the U.S. industry that
would so weaken the national economy as to impair the national
security."9
The Mandatory Program applies to both crude oil and refined
products. 10 As under the previous program there are actually two
separately administered schemes, Districts I-IV (east of the Rockies),
and District V (west coast). Initially, the quota set the maximum level
of crude oil and products at approximately 9% of total demand as
estimated by the Bureau of Mines. Product imports were not to
exceed 1957 levels. In 1962 the quota changed from a demand basis to
a production basis by which the maximum level of imports was set at
12.2% of domestic production. This rule restricting imports to a
percent of domestic production continues with two exceptions. First,
in 1972 the President has permitted on a temporary basis additional
imports to Districts I to IV, and second, in District V the quota is
variable, being equal to the shortfall of combined District V plus
Canadian production relative to total demand in District V.
Among refineries, quotas ("tickets") are allocated as a percentage of
refinery inputs, subject to (a) two modifications, (b) a swap arrangement, and (c) a "finangle" factor. These are discussed in order:
(a) (1) The sliding scale. Refineries are allocated quotas according
to the volume of domestic inputs. The greater the volume of inputs
the greater the total quota allocation, but the smaller the allocation as
a percentage of total refinery inputs. Table 1 is the scale applicable in
1969. The percentages and classes (by volume) vary year to year
Table 1
Average b/d of inputs

Percentage
allocation
Districts I-IV

first 10,000
next 20,000
next 70,000
all additional
Source: Adapted from Report, supra, 12.

19.5
11.0
7.0
3.0

Percentage
allocation
District V
40.0
9.3
4.1
1.9

9. Report, supra note 3, at 115.
10. The program distinguishes 1) crude oil, 2) unfinished oils, 3) finished products-and 4)
residual fuel oil to be used as fuel. Except for residual fuel oil, all unfinished oil and finished
products are, in effect, carved out of the crude oil quota.For details, see Report, supra note 3, at
9; Dam, supra note 2, at 15.
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depending on 1) total imports available for allocation, and 2)
changing policy objectives and preferences.
(2) Historical minimums. Tickets allotted to any refinery under the
sliding scale are subject to a minimum allotment according to the
firm's last allocation under the Voluntary Program. These historical
minimums are gradually being reduced and eliminated.
(b) Exchanges. Quotas may not be sold, but may be exchanged for
domestic crudes or unfinished oils." This permits inland refiners and
others not in a position to refine imported crudes to realize most of
the value of their allotment. The dollar value of quotas to firms is
easily determined from the ratio at which firms exchange domestic oil
for foreign. Petrochemical firms, which receive quotas although they
do not use crude oil as input (they use, rather, crude derivatives),
exchange their allocation of crude for petrochemical feedstocks.
(c) Manipulation of allocation computations. Again, the principal
factor in determining allocations to specific firms is the volume of a
given refinery's inputs, such that quota allocations are a positive
function of input volume. Thus, the larger the input "base," the larger
the quota allocation. It is this "base" that is manipulated. The
reasoning underlying this procedure is this: certain imports are
exempted from the quota either as the result of implied or expressed
policy preferences or because there is no justification for restricting
them given the program's "national security" basis. 12 On the other
hand, it is desired to mitigate the price attractiveness of these
non-domestic sources. Consequently, certain imports which are not
subject to the quota may not be counted as refinery inputs for
purposes of determining quota allocations. To the extent that a
refinery uses low cost exempt inputs in place of domestic inputs, its
quota allocation is reduced.
EXEMPTIONS AND PREFERENCES
If the Mandatory Program is complicated by the procedure
described above, it becomes positively intricate with a web of
"exemptions" and "preferences" that may delight lawyers and
confound the public.
a) Overland shipments. Quota exemptions were initially granted
to imported oil shipped overland to the U.S., i.e., from Mexico and
Canada. 13 Overland transport, however, is not an attractive mode for
shipping the relatively modest authorized quantities (30,000 barrels
11. Exchanges between District V and Districts I-IV are prohibited.
12. For example, quite secure Canadian sources of supply. This and other exceptions to the
program are discussed in detail below.
13. Subject to intergovernmental agreements as to quantities.
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per day) of Mexican oil. This gave rise to "El Loophole" or "The
Brownsville U-Turn," which was an arrangement whereby Mexican
oil was shipped by tanker to Brownsville, Texas. The oil was landed in
bond and transferred to trucks. The trucks crossed the Rio Grande
into Mexico, turned around and immediately recrossed the border.
The oil was then released from bond and shipped by tanker to the
East Coast, whereupon it was construed to have arrived overland.
This bit of nonsense, which had been devised as a matter of
expediency relating to short-haul Venezuelan crudes, was discontinued in January 1971 when what amounted to a country-of-origin
14
quota was assigned to Mexico.
On the other hand, the ["maritime overland"] exemption has not
been extended to shipments from Canada across the Great Lakes or to
rail shipments from Canada to Ketchikan in southern Alaska because
of a short inland waterway crossing by rail-car ferry. 15 The potential
volume of lower cost Canadian crudes threatened to become "a
gaping hole in the Mandatory Program through which could eventually flow enough crude oil to cause the Program to flounder."' 6 To
protect the Program, and at the same time maintain the credibility of
the Program's "national security" basis, Canadian crudes were
initially excluded from the refinery input base for determining quota
allocations. Presently, they are subtracted from the total amount of
crude oil that is permitted to flow into Districts I to IV, and a ceiling
of 675,000 barrels per day is maintained on Canadian exports
produced in Canada. Both rules made Canadian crude considerably
less attractive.
The problem of how to treat Canadian crudes is yet more complex:
The so-called "Northern Tier" refiners had been built in the U.S.
along the Canadian border in anticipation of using Canadian oil. To
reduce the competitive disadvantage that would otherwise have been
imposed on these refineries, they were granted higher historical
allocation, but this higher allocation was also reduced at a more rapid
rate than for other refineries. The treatment of Canadian oil generates
a feeling for the awkwardness inherent in attempting to meet vaguely
defined objectives via a quota system.
b) The sliding scale and the historical minimums embody an
implied set of preferences. The sliding scale favors smaller refineries
by a considerable margin over larger. The historical minimum is
subject to the same criticisms attributed to the principle under the
14. Allocations of the Mexican quota to U.S. refineries is left to Pemex, the Mexican National
petroleum company.
15. Report, supra note 3, at 10.
16. Dam, supra note 2, at 29.
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Voluntary Program. Although, this appears to be a preference more
tenuously held since it is being eliminated in stages.
c) Petrochemicals. The oil import quota program is an attempt to
distort the allocation of resources that a free market would otherwise
direct. This distortion reverberates through the economy, affecting
persons, commodities, industries and prices that are outside the target
area of the original decision to intervene in the market process. These
secondary impacts may run counter to other, equally pressing,
national objectives.
The petrochemical industry uses certain products of the petroleum
industry as feedstocks. The Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program, by
maintaining domestic prices higher than the world price, detrimentally affects the international competitive position of the petrochemical
industry. 17 The petrochemical industry is a major contributor to the
U.S. balance of payments (net exports in excess of one billion dollars
in 1971).18 To ameliorate deleterious balance of trade effects, quota
tickets were assigned directly to certain petrochemical firms, albeit in
a rather unsystematic manner, i.e., "through what is in effect
negotiation between the industry and government officials."' 9
Several problems arise in determining how the petrochemical industry should share in the quota program.
What portion of the total quota should be allocated to the
petrochemical industry? This involves, among other problems, identification of the industry. Petrochemicals, of which there are several
hundred, are manufactured both by oil companies and chemical
companies. The administrative solution was to designate as "petrochemical plants" those which converted by chemical reaction more
than 50% by weight of total plant inputs to petrochemicals. According to this formula a plant which converted 49% of its inputs to
petrochemicals was not a petrochemical plant; whereas a plant which
converted 99% of inputs was no more of a petrochemical plant than
its 51% cousin. Once over the 50% qualification marker the ratio of
inputs to petrochemical output did not matter, and allocations were
based on total inputs, i.e., petrochemical feedstocks and everthing else
that constituted plant inputs.
If the input basis for allocation is unsatisfactory, an output basis is
no more convenient. Petrochemicals vary widely by weight and
volume and are not easily, if at all, comparable. Clearly, the situation
of the petrochemical industry under the Mandatory Oil Import Quota
Program is ripe for revamping, but we see nothing in the present
17. And, of course, all other industries with petroleum.
18. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Census Reports FT 410, FT 246 (1972).
19. Report, supra note 3, at 13.
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program or in its development that suggests that a consensus will be
reached among the industries, government, and the public.
d) Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Both Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands have been brought within the import quota system to
the extent that they are generally prohibited from becoming loopholes in the import quota system. However, several petroleum
refineries have been given additional allocations and the right to
export into the continental United States when the direct effect of
such action was to create additional employment and spur economic
development, and the companies additionally agreed to pay a per
barrel fee into a special conservation fund.
e) Low sulfur bonus. In 1967, a presidential proclamation authorized the additional allocation of crude oil on a bonus basis to firms
manufacturing low sulfur content residual fuel oil in the United States
specifically to meet local pollution abatement requirements. 2 0 Under
this authorization, District V has been granted several of these
bonuses under different conditions. Bonuses in Districts I to IV have
been granted, suspended and generally inactivated. However, another
type of allocation has occurred in Districts II to IV in which
allocations for the importation of low sulfur residual fuel were
granted directly to electric utilities in 1970. Later in the year,
terminal operators in District I who were in the business of selling No.
2 residual fuel oil were also granted allocations directly for the
importation of residual fuel made from Western Hemispheric crude.
AN ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF DOMESTIC CRUDE
OIL MARKET STRUCTURES
i. "DistrictV'
In order to determine the social costs of the Mandatory Oil Import
Quota Program a brief description of the market structures that result
from this program is important.
In PAD District V, domestic production is fully protected from
foreign competition up to a specified domestic price in these states.
This price depends upon the quantity of various crude oils. If the
quantity of oil demanded exceeds the quantity of oil supplied by
domestic plus Canadian producers, then foreign oil is permitted to
enter District V to meet the excess quantity demanded in this district
at the historical domestic price. It is important to note that Canadian
producers are not completely free to export unlimited quantities of
crude oil, since they are restricted by the existing capacity of the
Trans-Mountain Pipeline which transports oil from Edmonton to
20. Report, supra note 3, at 14; Dam, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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Puget Sound. Finally, inter-district flows of oil from states east of the
Rockies into District V have been negligible. This is of course
necessary if the practice of operating two distinct programs is to
continue.
Figure 2 depicts diagrammatically the effect of these market
restrictions on the supply function and the equilibrium price in
District V. Let Sv be the marginal cost curve of domestic producers as
well as Canadian producers. At a price of Pd per barrel the quantity
of oil demanded exceeds the quantity of oil supplied by an amount
equal to QF This is the amount of foreign oil which is permitted to
be imported into District V. The supply curve for foreign oil (Sv) is
perfectly inelastic for amounts in excess of QFas imports are restricted
to that quantity. This is true even if the marginal cost of foreign oil in
amounts greater than QFis lower than domestic cost (for simplicity we
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have assumed that the marginal and average costs of foreign oil are
21
equal).
The resultant market supply schedule under District V's quota
system is the function defined by segments A B C E F in Figure 3. If

C

IH

Q1

MM b/d

Q2

Figure
Demand and Supply

3
District

2

quota restrictions were removed and all foreign oil had costs
represented by the completely elastic portion of the SF curve in
Figure 2, equivalent to segment B-C in Figure 3, the new market
equilibrium point would be reached at point G. Quantity would
increase from Q 1 to Q2 and price would decline from Pd to Pf. This
latter free market situation would result in a decline in domestic
production at the same time total consumption increased, since some
domestic oil would not be competitive at the world price which is the
cost of foreign oil. The resulting economic efficiency gains would have
two components: first, the costs of supplying that quantity which is
21. Since a large proportion of the cost of foreign oil is tanker costs and royalty taxes, the
assumption that marginal and average costs are equal is probably close to being accurate.
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consumed with the quota system in effect would be decreased by an
amount represented by area CEH. Second, consumption would
increase and prices fall yielding consumer benefits represented by
area HEG. Looked at in another way the present quota system has
social costs associated with it equal to the sum of these two
components, or area CEG.
ii. "'Eastof the Rockies"
The supply curve of crude oil east of the Rockies, that is PAD
Districts I to IV, is derived somewhat differently, First, the amount of
crude oil permitted to be imported is a percentage of estimated
production in Districts I-IV. Until at least the end of 1971, that
percentage was 12.2%.22 The actual permitted volume of imports has
been increased frequently since then in response to realized or
anticipated shortages. While announcements since 1971 no longer
refer to a fixed percentage of District I-IV production, neither has the
principle been explicitly abandoned. It appears that policy makers
have been making a series of ad hoc, temporary adjustments to cope
with changing market conditions. Until such time as the policy is
explicitly changed, importers and refiners may be expected to act as if
these adjustments are merely temporary.
The second distinction between District V and Districts I-IV is that
since 1971 the overland exemption has ended for Canadian crude and
it is treated as an import East of the Rockies.
Third, domestic oil is restricted by a system of state demand
prorationing restrictions, which are also presently and apparently
temporarily under revision. Whereas production of individual wells
was formerly regulated administratively, individual well production is
now set at "100% allowable" in most or all of the regulating states. It
is important to note that a "100% allowable" is not necessarily the
same as maximum efficient productive capacity. Therefore, even
when allowable levels of domestic production are set at "100%"
levels, domestic production may be less than that which would occur
if prorationing restrictions were removed entirely. The flexibility of
the prorationing restrictions to the "100%" limit appears to be
23
another instance of temporary adjustment to market conditions.
The effect of the domestic restriction is that the individual
marginal cost curves of each producing well, field, or firm can not
simply be added horizontally as we normally assume to be the case in
22. Proclamation 4099, 36 Fed. Reg. 246 (1971).
23. If there were no intention ever to restore effective prorationing, one would expect repeal
of the so-called "Connally Hot Oil Amendments," the legislation which permits state demand
prorationing. In the absence of movement in that direction, the market continues to be
influenced by prorationing.
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a competitive industry. Instead, each producing unit is assigned a
certain allowable level of production per month. The result is that
some low cost wells are sometimes idle, while higher cost wells are
producing. Firms will produce from each well the allowable quantity
of oil as long as the marginal costs of a barrel of oil are less than the
market price. Consequently, the domestic supply function is usually
above the function that would prevail in the absence of prorationing
restrictions.
Furthermore, under such circumstances the cost of production will
also exceed the production costs that would be expended in the
absence of prorationing. As a result of prorationing there is a loss in
economic efficiency, a higher price paid by consumers, and a lower
quantity of oil consumed in each time period. Offsetting these
deleterious economic effects, it is averred that more domestic oil is
ultimately recovered than would otherwise be the case. 24
In Figure 4, we show the supply curve for Districts I to IV that
would be derived by horizontally adding the domestic supply curve
(with the market demand prorationing restrictions) and the foreign
supply curve (which is assumed to include Canadian crude oil and to
be based upon constant marginal cost). We label this market supply
curve s+v aand to avoid confusion, the exact labeling of the various
segments that make up s"' is HABCIJ. The fact that domestic supply
is restricted by quota and prorationing to the equilibrium quantity, Q1
minus the quantity of foreign oil, QFR, results in an inelastic supply
curve for both domestic and foreign oil at the equilibrium level, as
indicated by the IJ segment.
Prorationing and the quota system east of the Rockies depend upon
one another for effectiveness. If the quota system were to be removed,
it is unlikely that the prorationing system as it is presently operated
would be viable, since lower cost foreign oil suplies would displace
prorationed domestic supplies. To the extent that this is true,
removing the quotas east of the Rockies would reduce the cost of
producing some domestic crude oil. This would be represented by
area HAB in Figure 4. Additionally, a substantial portion of the
domestic crude oil transported into east coast ports is presently
carried in U.S. tankers, due to the restrictions of the Jones Act. 2 5 Since
these tankers are more costly than foreign tanker displacing domestic
24. Although a discussion of the pros and cons of prorationing is stepping somewhat outside
the main purpose of the present discussion, it is important to note that systems which will
preserve the economic efficiency rule of least cost production and maximization of the ultimate
recoverable crude oil have been discussed at great lengths elsewhere. The practice is called unit
field production. See Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil Industry, Am.
Econ. Rev., March, 1963, at 53, 85-108.
25. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 861 et seq. (1964).
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crude in east coast ports will yield another gain to economic
efficiency in the form of reduced costs.
A second component of benefits that would result from removing
quotas would be the cost savings that might accrue from displacing
higher cost domestic crude oil with lower cost foreign crude oil at the
present level of consumption. The cost saving results from a
breakdown of the state prorationing system which, as noted above,
depends on the quota program for its effectiveness. This component
would be represented by area CIL in Figure 4. Finally, since reduced
price would be likely to result in increased consumption there would
be additional consumer benefits represented by area LIM.
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iii. Market Composition
In Tables 2 and 3, we show the actual effect of the market
restrictions described above on the quantity of oil supplied to
different U.S. markets in 1970 by source of supply. The somewhat
surprising result is that with very different formulas for setting the
level of imports, the ratio of imports to domestic production was the
same in both regions of the country in 1970 at 12.2% [note that this
calculation depends upon a broader definition in District V, which
includes the Trans-Mountain capacity, which is considered safe for
national security purposes].
Nationally the actual imports of oil were slightly more than 30% of
domestic production in 1970. However, only a small percentage
(4.2%) of domestic consumption in 1970 came from North Africa or
the Persian Gulf. And about half of this came from the non-Arab
country of Iran. Given the national security justification of the
Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program, the fact that only about two
per cent of the consumption in the United States comes from this
relatively insecure part of the world should be noted.
Table 2
District V Sources of Supply in 1970
(thousand of barrels per day)
Cumulative
Daily Total

Daily Total
District V Production
Other Domestic Sources
Canadian Overland (Exempt)
Venezuela
Persian Gulf
Indonesia
Less Exports to South East Asia
(Taiwan)
Ratio of Net Foreign Imports
less 50 barrels of Indonesian Supply to District
V plus Canadian Exempt Supply
Total Actual Imports (exc. Canada)
(Domestic Production in District V
+
Canadian Production)
Total Actual Imports
Domestic Production in
District V

1,304
193
220
100
115
100
(78)

1,304
1,497
1,717
1,817
1,932
2,032
1,954

(100 + 115 + 50 (1,304 + 220)

=

237

=

78)

12.2%

15.6%

1524

_

457
1304

35.0%

Sources: Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, "Mineral Industry Surveys,"
Washington, D.C. (various year-end summary issues) such as December 1968,
December 1969, 1969 Final Summary and June 1971) ... ;and Office of Oil and
Gas, Map and Summary of International and Interregional Flows of Crude Oil in
1970, Washington, D.C., 1971.
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Table 3
"Districts I to IV Sources of Supply in 1970"
(thousands of barrels daily)
Daily Total
10,007
24
(193)

Districts I to IV Production
Other Domestic Sources
Other Domestic Outflows
Canada (includes 35 above the 1970
annual limit set by President
Nixon)
Mexico
Caribbean (includes 34.8 to
Puerto Rico outside the system
Other Western Hemisphere
Free Europe
North Africa
West Africa
Middle East via pipeline
Middle East via the Cape of
Good Hope
Sum of foreign imports less 1,513
in residual fuel oil, less Canadian above the limit (35), less
exports (142) and less Puerto Rico
(34.8) divided by domestic production in Districts I to IV
Total actualimports
Domestic Production in
Districts I to IV

1222

Cumulative
Daily Total
10,007
10,031
9,838

430
45

10,268
10,313

1,550
225
120
220
80
25

11,863
12,088
12,208
12,428
12,508
12,533

260

12,793

=

12.2%

2995 =
10007

29.5%

10007

=

Sources: Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, "Mineral Industry Surveys,"
Washington, D.C. (various year-end summary issues) such as December 1968,
December 1969, 1969 Final Summary and June 1971)... ;and Office of Oil and
Gas, Map and Summary of International and Interregional Flows of Crude Oil in
1970, Washington, D.C., 1971.

This statement is not made to minimize the prospects of future
dependence on Persian Gulf sources of supply as U.S. demand
increases. (We show some recent forecasts in Appendix B.) In fact,
there are several reasons why the Persian Gulf area (especially the
non-Arab country of Iran) may become a major source of U.S. oil.
First, the other industrialized countries of the free world, most
notably western Europe and Japan have an even faster rate of growth
in demand than the U.S. These areas, too, will compete for secure,
non-Arab sources of supply, which cannot be expected to meet the
entire free world demand. Second, the production costs in the Persian
Gulf are among the lowest. Additionally, a growing world oil tanker
industry is making advances in: (1) improved speed, (2) efficiency and
(3) capacity, which tend to reduce the transportation costs of these
more distant sources of supply. Finally, the prospect of increasing
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taxes and demands for participation and/or ownership by host
countries in the petroleum operations and profits, means that foreign
oil is more valuable for the U.S. and the oil industry today than at
some point in the future, a principle known popularly as making hay
while the sun shines.
ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL COST OF
THE MANDATORY OIL IMPORT QUOTA PROGRAM

By using the analytical descriptions of the domestic markets for
crude oil which were described in the previous section and the prices,
costs and supply schedules presented in Table 4 and Appendices A, B
and C respectively, we can estimate the social cost, amount of subsidy
and equity effects of the present Mandatory Oil Import Quota
Table 4
1971 Crude Oil Prices in Various Markets
Market
New York

Quality
30-30.90 API

Los Angeles

30-30.90 API
California sulfur range 1%
to 2%.
26-26.90 API

Chicago

Price per
Barrel
$4.14

$3.43

$3.89

Source
Louisiana South plus
gathering costs of 140
and transportation of
454.
Signal Hill plus gathering and transportation costs of 54.
Louisiana South plus
gathering costs of 94
and transportation of
250.
Platt's Crude Oil Summary Aug. 25, 1971.

30-30.90 API
$3.55
(less than .5%
sulfur).
Platt's
$1.83
Average of all
Tokyo
August 19, 1971.
Crudes Imported.
Platt's
$1.98
Average of all
Canada (Eastern)
Crudes Imported
for April 1, 1971
listings.
Venezuela
$2.08
Platt's as of May 1971.
Average of all
$3.03
West Germany
imports.
Platt's as of June 1971.
$2.74
Average of all
United Kingdom
imports.
Platt's as of June 1971.
$1.53
Australia
Average of all
imports.
All prices are based upon data published in recent editions of Platt'sOilgram Price Service,
with U.S. prices based upon Crude Oil Supplement of August 25, 1971, Volume 49, No.
164-B. Costs are based upon the Cabinet Task Force, (1970) for Chicago and New York and
the State of Alaska, (1971) and Tussing, et. al. (19710.
South Louisiana
(Wellhead)
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Program. These calculations will be made at two points in time-year
end 1970 (the last year for which adequate actual data is available)
and 1975 using various forecasts and different assumptions about 1975.
Separate calculations will also be made for each of the two separately
regulated domestic markets, District V and the east of the Rockies
market or Districts I-IV.
a. The Impact of Quotas in District V
At year end 1970 the average price of crude oil was $3.43 per
barrel in District V (from Table 4). The price that would be expected
if quotas were dropped would be the world price or $2.42 per barrel
(i.e., $2.30 from Table 1, Appendix A, plus 10.50 U.S. Tariff, plus 1¢
additional transportation cost to Los Angeles). Since oil consumption
in 1970 was about 1.95 million barrels per day or about 713 million
barrels per year in District V, the total subsidy from consumers of oil
to producers of domestic oil and refiners of foreign crude oil was
about $720,000,000 in 1970. ($1.01 x 713 million barrels).
To determine the amount of domestic oil that is produced at real
costs in excess of the foreign crude alternatives, we can use the supply
schedule derived in Appendix C, and the real cost of foreign crude. A
"without quota" point of reference for the latter is the Los Angeles
price of Persian Gulf crude less federal excise tax, i.e., $2.31. The
domestic price of crude at Los Angeles at year end 1970 was $3.43 per
barrel (from Table 4). At the 1970 level of consumption, about
550,000 barrels per day, and a difference in real costs of $1.12 per
barrel, we can calculate the first component of social costs-corresponding to the triangular area CEH in Figure 3. These costs equal
the amount of resources that are needlessly expended to produce the
same quantity of crude oil at the current price and can be calculated
by:
social costs (component 1) = 1 $. 112 .550,00
365 days
2 'b ar-rel

day

year

$112,000,000 per year
If it is assumed that the slope of the demand schedule is equal to
the slope of the supply schedule (in terms of elasticity in equilibrium
this implicitly assumes the two have an elasticity of about 1.1), then
we can also calculate the social costs that result from foregone
consumer surplus. Since a higher price and lower quantity are caused
by restricting competition this is a real loss to society. Assuming the
slopes of demand and supply are equal means that the social cost of
this second component equals the first or $112,000,000 per year.
Should the oil supply schedule be less elastic in equilibrium than
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demand this is an underestimate of the second component of social
cost, and vice versa.
To calculate the size of the subsidy and social costs of the
Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program in 1975 we can use the same
approach but several variables may be expected to change in value.
In Appendix A the future cost and price of foreign crude are
estimated using the presently contracted crude price increases and an
assumption that new technology will reduce the transportation costs
of foreign crude oil. The expected price and real cost of foreign crude
are $2.30 and $2.19 per barrel for these assumptions in District V in
1975. If the present tanker technology is not improved, costs will not
fall and for this assumption the foreign price and real costs are
expected to be $2.48 and $2.59 per barrel in District V in 1975.
The level of consumption is estimated to grow to 2.4 MMb/d in
1975 in District V. We will calculate social costs and the size of the
subsidy for two different cases. First we will assume that domestic
production will not increase, since domestic prices will be assumed to
be fixed at their year end 1970 level. Therefore, under this first case
all new demand will be supplied by foreign crude oil. Under this case
the social costs of the unnecessary expenditures to produce the same
quantity of crude oil at the current price (component 1) will change
only slightly from their 1970 level, increasing if new technology in
transportation is implemented and decreasing if current technology is
unchanged. Since demand has grown, we are certain that the second
component of social costs, foregone consumer surplus benefits, will be
greater in 1975 than as estimated in 1970. We can therefore be
certain that the 1970 estimate of total social costs, $224,000,000 per
year in District V will be an underestimate of 1975 District V social
costs.
On the other hand, we are also reasonably certain, even assuming
that District V prices are fixed, that the size of the subsidy from
consumers to oil companies will increase, since the total annual
consumption is forecast to increase. Using new tanker technology the
price of foreign crude oil was expected to fall in 1975 relative to 1970,
which will also increase the size of the subsidy. However, with the old
technology tankers, foreign crude prices will increase, thus tending of
offset the growth in consumption. Using the same approach as
outlined above, the 1975 District V subsidy, assuming domestic prices
are constant, can be calculated as:
New Tanker
2.4 million barrels
365 days
($3.43-$2.30)
Technology
day
year
barrel
- $990 million per year
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Old Tanker
Technology

2.4 million barrels
day

365 days
year
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($3.43-$2.59)

barrel

$733 million per year
An alternative method to meet growth in demand would be for
domestic supply to expand in response to an increase in the domestic
price of crude oil. Using the supply schedules derived in Appendix C,
the price of domestic crude oil would have to increase by about 90
per barrel in order for domestic production to expand to meet the
expected growth in demand. This means that the 1975 price would
increase to $4.33 per barrel in District V. Under this case both the
social costs and size of the subsidy will increase significantly relative
to the 1970 estimates. Using the same procedures as before, social
costs and subsidies can be calculated as follows:
Social Costs

Component 1
New Tanker I
Technology f

(1.0 million barrels)
day
$391 million per year

365 days
year

($4.33-$2.19)
barrel

Assuming equal elasticities of supply and demand, component 1
equals component 2 and total social costs equal $782 million per year.
Old Tanker
Technology

1
T

(1.0 million barrels)
day

365 days
year

($4.33-$2.48)
barrel

$338 million per year

Assuming equal slopes for demand and supply total social costs
equal about $676 million per year.
Subsidy
New Tanker
Technology

($4.33-$2.30)
barrel

2.4 million barrels
day

365 days
year

$1.78 billion per year

Old Tanker
Technology

($4.33-$2.59)
barrel

2.4 million barrels
day

365 days
year

$1.52 billion per year
The subsidy and social costs calculations presented above for District
V in 1970 and 1975 are summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5
Summary of the Social Costs and Subsidy of the Mandatory
Oil Import Quota Program in District V in 1970 and 1975
(Annual Costs)
Social Costs
1970

$224 million

1975
(a) No domestic price change
all new demand met by
foreign crudea
(1) Old Tanker Technologya
$219 million
(2) New Tanker Technologya
$234 million
(b) No increase in foreign
crude imports, domestic
price increase of 900
per barrel
(1) Old Tanker Technology
$676 million
(2) New Tanker Technology
$782 million
aRough estimates based upon the change in real costs per barrel

Subsidy
$720 million

$733 million
$990 million

$1,520 million
$1,780 million

b. The Impact of Quotas East of the Rockies
By making use of the analytical model described above, the prices,
costs, levels of consumption described in the attached appendices,
and a methodology similar to that used for District V can be applied
to Districts I to IV. In order to apply such a procedure, average
domestic and foreign prices must be calculated due to the difference
noted above for the three principal markets east of the Rockies, New
York, Chicago, and the Gulf Coast. Using 1970 regional consumption
estimates these are derived as follows:
Region
New York
Chicago
Gulf

Consumption
46%
32%
22%
100%

Price
$4.14 per barrel
3.89
3.55
$3.93 per barrel
Foreign price

Foreign
Real Cost
$2.31 per barrel
2.56
2.31
$2.39 per barrel;
$2.50 per barrel

The demand in Districts I to IV in 1970 was 12.8 million barrels per
day. Of this total about 3 million barrels were imported each day.
Based on the supply schedule derived in Appendix C, about 4 million
barrels per day of domestic crude were produced at costs below the
average real cost of foreign crude, or about $2.39 per barrel. In 1975,
demand in Districts I to IV is expected to grow to 15.6 million barrels
per day at current prices. Consider two cases: first, the situation in
which all the increase in domestic consumption comes about without
a price increase due to an increase in foreign imports of one million
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barrels of oil per day and an increase in domestic production in
Alaska all of which is assumed to be supplied to the oil short markets
east of the Rockies markets at real costs below the cost of foreign
crude oil. Alaskan oil will presumably supply about 1.8 million barrels
per day in 1975. An equivalent to this case is to assume that all the
new demand is supplied by low cost foreign crude with no increase in
domestic price.
Alternatively, consider a case in which demand prorationing
restrictions are eliminated to permit an increase in domestic production to meet an increase in domestic price. Under this case foreign
imports will presumably remain at their 1970 level and we calculate
the size of the price increase required to expand domestic output by
2.8 million barrels per day, i.e., about $.48 per barrel; thus the 1975
price would be $4.41 per barrel. Interestingly, the Oil and Gas
Journal of May 10, 1971, published a forecast of $4.50/bbl by 1980.
The size of the subsidy and social cost table were calculated for these
two cases in 1975. The calculations are summarized in Table 6. Note
that the resource costs of the Jones Act and state prorationing are not
Table 6
Summary of the Social Costs and Subsidy of the
Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program in Districts
I to IV in 1970 and 1975
(Annual Costs)
Social Cost

Subsidy

1970
$3.26 million
$ 6.68 billion
1975
(a) No Domestic Price
Increase expand Alaskan
production and Foreign
Inputs
Imports
(1) Old Tanker
$2.96 billion
$ 7.20 billion
Technologya
(2) New Tanker
$3.56 billion
$ 8.85 billion
Technologya
(b) Domestic Price Increases
by 48 per barrel to expand domestic production
outside of Alaska
(1) Old Tanker
$5.88 billion
$ 9.90 billion
Technology
(2) New Tanker
$6.80 billion
$11.56 billion
Technology
aApproximate adjustments to reflect changes in tanker technology. Note also that part of
the decline in social costs is due to supplying east of the Rocky markets with low cost
Alaskan crude at the rate of 1.8 million barrels per day in 1975.
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included in the social cost estimates. However, since both contribute
to higher prices east of the Rockies, we must not attribute the full
subsidy from consumers to oil companies to the Mandatory Oil Import
Quota Program. In the case of the Jones Act, which would be a
subsidy from consumers to the domestic maritime industry, we can
determine the approximate percentage of the subsidy that is due to
this restriction. The average price difference between domestic and
foreign crudes is about $1.50 per barrel. An outside estimate of the
extra cost of transporting domestic crude due to the Jones Act is 25¢
per barrel. About 50% of the crude east of the Rockies might be
affected by the Jones Act, therefore something less than 1/12
(= .25 X 'I of the subsidy calculated in Table 6 should be attributed to
the maritime industry, the remainder goes to oil companies and is due
to the joint restrictions of supply caused by the Mandatory Oil Import
Quota Program, and the residual to the effects of state demand
prorationing which continue to be felt.
c. National Totals and Policy Implications
Table 7 summarizes the social cost and subsidy calculations for the
nation in 1970 and 1975. Both the program's social costs and its
Table 7
Summary of the Social Costs and Subsidy of the
Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program for the
Nation in 1970 and 1975
(Annual Cost)
Social Cost
1970
1975
(a) No Domestic Price Increase
(1) Old Tanker Technology
(2) New Tanker Technology
(b) Domestic Price Increase
(1) Old Tanker Technology
(2) New Tanker Technology

Subsidy

$3.5 billion

$ 7.4 billion

$3.2 billion
$3.8 billion

$ 7.9 billion
$ 9.8 billion

$6.6 billion
$7.6 billion

$11.4 billion
$13.4 billion

resultant subsidy are expected to increase quite significantly in 1975
relative to 1970. Also, if domestic price increases are used to hold the
percentage of foreign crudes down to levels approximately equal to
their present levels, both values can be expected to almost double in
1975 relative to 1970.
On the other hand current (1972) administration policies are
answering short run growth in demand by gradually increasing the
amount of foreign imports. 2 6 Since this is a gradual addition to supply
26. See reports published during the summer of 1972 in the Washington Post, Wall Street
Journal and other sources of the Nixon administration plans to selectively increase oil import
quotas on an interim basis.
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the effect of the supply restrictions in keeping the price high will be
undiminished. Present policies, which will result in an increase in
foreign dependence in any case, will result in greater social costs and
subsidies, and could be replaced immediately by dropping foreign
restrictions and thus preventing further inefficient use of resources of
more than $3 billion per year and consumer subsidies to oil companies
of about $9 billion per year.
An additional clarification about present and future conditions is in
order: when foreign taxes are treated as real costs to the U.S.-not
simply intergovernmental transfers-the average cost of U.S. oil ($1.90
per barrel as calculated in Appendix D) is actually lower than the
estimate for foreign crude made above. This was also noted by
Stauffer2 7 since economic benefits and costs are determined from
marginal rather than average costs. This finding, however, does not
alter the conclusions of the preceding analysis.
The fact that the recent increase in taxes paid to foreign
governments (resulting from higher posted prices) has resulted in
higher average real cost does, however, represent a significant change
in relative cost.
The analysis in this paper assumes that the relative costs of foreign
and domestic oil would be constant through 1975, which depends
on the tax and royalty payments extracted by the OPEC countries
from U.S. buyers. These payments are based on posted prices, not the
actual f.o.b. price of oil.
In a competitive world market one would expect purchasers of
foreign oil to resist such price increases as part of the ordinary
bargaining process between buyers and sellers. But because U.S. oil
companies receive a credit on their U.S. corporate income tax for
payments to foreign governments, the additional foreign tax bite is
rather less painful and proportionately less resisted. Such changes in
relative prices may be readily incorporated into this analysis,
although enormous complexity is involved in the determination of a
single estimate for social cost.
The policy which seems more likely given past history of government regulations in the oil industry is for some increase in domestic
price to prevent a loss of markets to foreign competition. If this
alternative is selected, the present social costs and subsidy will nearly
double in the five years from the publication of the Cabinet Task
Force Report to 1975. The program will require the expenditure of
non-productive resources of about $6 billion in 1975 under this latter
case. It is useful to compare such a cost with the intended benefit of
27. Estimated Economic Cost of U.S. Crude Oil Production, a paper by T. R. Stauffer
presented to the Society of Petroleum Engineers, San Antonio, Texas, Oct., 1972.
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the program, national security. The Cabinet Task Force calculated
that as an alternative to the quota system oil equal to a one-year
supply of foreign consumption could be purchased and stored in
either steel tanks or salt domes. It estimated the costs of such
28
alternatives at 40 to 730 for tanks and 190 to 450,. for domes.
Assuming that about 30% of the total consumption would be imported
in 1975, this means that even if the cost of storage was to increase to
$1.00 per barrel of annual equivalent of foreign crude, storage still
costs less than $2 billion per year and saves from about $1.5 to $4.5
billion per year in real resources.
Considering the second justification of the Mandatory Oil Import
Quota Program, protection of domestic production, it should be noted
that this could be accomplished in a more equitable manner. First, a
tariff program could replace the current quota program. This would
keep the domestic price high but would also transfer to the treasury
some of the subsidy now going to oil companies and refineries. This
would reduce the need for new taxes in 1975 by about $4 billion and
still leave the industry subsidized for its domestic production since
prices would be kept high.
A tariff would also make the price in Los Angeles and New York
the same for foreign crude oil. At the present time prices are some
700 per barrel higher in New York due to the Mandatory Oil Import
Quota Program in conjunction with state demand prorationing and
the Jones Act. This inequity, which falls most heavily on east coast
consumers, would be removed by a federal tariff applied equally to all
foreign crude oil imports. The separate schemes now used under the
present two part quota system could be replaced by an equally
applied tariff.
In closing, it should be noted that if the costs of the present
program as described above are considered too large relative to the
benefits of the program, i.e., national security and protection of
domestic production from competition, then a final policy alternative
would be to drop the Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program entirely
and allow the competitive laws of the free enterprise capital system,
unfettered by bureaucratic decision-making, to determine the resultant market price and quantity of oil. Such a decision would save from
about $3.25 billion to $7.5 billion per year in real resources in 1975
and result in savings to consumers of about $8 billion to $13.5 billion
per year in 1975.

28. Report, supra note 3, at 299-309.
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Appendix A
Cost of the Alternative Source of Supply
To calculate the real cost of a foreign crude oil, a specific reference crude, Iranian Light 34'
API, has been selected. In Table A-i this cost is derived. In determining the real cost of foreign
crude oil to the United States, and adopting a national efficiency perspective, taxes paid to
foreign governments represent real costs for the United States, while taxes paid to governments
within the country are monetary transfers. [The national efficiency perspective, it should be
noted, lends an upward bias to the estimate of real cost. As noted, infra, a world efficiency
reduces the estimate of real costs, but still not to zero.] The reason for this conclusion is that
payments made by oil companies to different state treasuries reduce the welfare of oil company
owners, but this is offset by benefits to taxpayers. Such transactions are usually considered
transfers of income within an economy rather than real resource costs. When tax payments are
made to residents of another country, this is not the case. At some point in the future, such tax
receipts may be used to demand real goods or services from the U.S. economy, and as such,
would represent real costs to this country. Therefore unless a world efficiency perspective which
took into account comparative advantages as opposed to a national efficiency perspective, were
to be adopted, such a levy by oil producing countries must be considered real costs to the
importing economy. It should be noted that by asymmetrically treating foreign taxes as real
cost, all estimates of the social cost of the Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program made in the
text above are understated.
Tariffs paid to the U.S. Treasury (approximately 10.5c per barrel) are monetary transfers.
Accordingly, by subtracting U.S. taxes and including taxes paid to producing countries, the real
cost of a barrel of oil, using Iranian Light (340 API, 1.4% sulfur) as a reference crude, is $2.13 in
1975. An additional adjustment is necessary to make the Iranian Light reference crude
comparable to the quality of domestic oil that will be used for comparison purposes (300 API)
(degree API). This means that the average cost of the lighter Iranian crude would be $2.07 per
barrel.
TABLE A-1
Average Costs for Persian Gulf Oil
Delivered to U.S. Coastal Ports
($ per barrel)
Iranian Light 340 API (1.4% Sulfur)
1971

1975

104
1.11
300

114
1.27
304

FOB arms length Price
Transportation Costsd
Total Cost to U.S. (delivered)
U.S. Tariff

$1.51
744
$2.25
10.54

$1.68
450
$2.13
10.54

Delivered Price
Average Price for early 1970's

$2.36

Productiona
Payments to Foreign Governmentsb
Other Costsc

$2.24
$2.30

aSee: M. A. Adelman, forthcoming manuscript to be published under the tentative title,
World Petroleum Markets, no attempt to relate this figure to the specific crude shown in
this table has been made. Adelman's calculation is best viewed as an overall average.
bSee: August 25, 1971 issue of Platt's Oilgram Price Service and June 21, 1971 issue of the
Oil and Gas Journal for CrudePrice Postings in 1971 and 1975. Payments to Foreign
Governments are based upon a 49% of posted price calculation, which has been approximately determined by Mikesell for Iran. See Mikesell, R. F., Foreign Investment in the
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425

Petroleum and Mineral Industries (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) (especially
p. 247).
cThese costs are used to include all other costs transportation and gathering and payments
made to determine the FOB arms length price. In a sumission to the Cabinet Task Force,
the New England Council, et. al., estimated this FOB price to be $1.30. At the old posting
of $1.80 and Adelman's production costs of 100, this would mean a difference of 300
($1.30-$1.00 (=.10 + 'A ($1.80))), which we denote as other costs.
dWe show a high and low cost for transportation to be consistent with the Cabinet Task
Force calculations. It should be noted that the New England Council, et. al., used a figure
of 57g. This would imply a $2.11 delivered price to the U.S. east coast, up 240 since their
1969 estimate.
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Appendix B Production and Consumption Forecasts
Domestic Production Forecasts
TABLE B-i
Well Head Price $3.50 per Barrel*
1970 Productiona
(actual)

11.3 MMb/d

1980 Production
(estimated)

15.6 MMb/d
(IPAA)

14.1 MMb/d
(CTF)

1975 Production
(Straight Line Estimate)

13.5 MMb/d
(IPAA)

12.7 MMb/d
(CTF)

Well Head Price $2.50 per Barrel*
8.0 MMb/d
(IPAA)
1975

9.7 MMb/d
(CTF)

Well Head Price $2.00 per Barrel
5.25 MMb/d
(IPAA)

8.2 MMb/d
(CTF)

*Joint Economic Committee, Report on Crude Oil and Gasoline Price Increases of
November 1970: A Background Study, U.S. Government Printing Office: November 3,
1971. Appendix P, prepared by the Independent Petroleum Association of America
(IPAA). Note CTF refers to the Cabinet Task Force, supra.
aSee tables 2 and 3 above

Table B-2
Production by Region in 1975
Under Different Price and Production Assumptions* (MMb/d)
Average Well
Head Price

National

Districts I-IV

District V

IPAA Production Schedule
$3.50
$2.50
$2.00

13.5
8.0
5.25

11.9
7.1
4.65

1.6
.9
.6

CTF Production Schedule
$3.50
12.7
11.2
1.5
$2.50
9.7
8.6
1.1
$2.00
8.2
7.2
1.0
*Joint Economic Committee, supra, November 3, 1971. The regional estimates in this table
are based on an assumption that the elasticity of supply of petroleum is the same in all
regions of the country. IPAA is the Independent Petroleum Association of America. CTF is
the Cabinet Task Force.
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Table B-3
Crude Oil Consumption Forecasts by
Region of the Country*

Year

National

District
I

II

Ill&IV

V

(MMb/d)
1.95
14.75
5.9
4.1
2.8
1970a
2.4
5.0
3.4
18.0
7.2
1975b
1980C
22.0
8.8
6.1
4.2
2.9
*Source: 1970 National and district V and I-IV totals based on values shown in table 2 and
table 3 above.
aThe District I to IV breakdown is based upon the breakdown found in: Timenes, N.,
"Analysis of Transportation Alternatives," appendix C, An Analysis of the Economic and
Security Aspects of the Trans Alaska Pipeline, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Interior, December, 1971.
bThe 1975 estimates were based upon the 1970 actual consumption data and 1980 forecasts. The same regional consumption patterns that existed in 1970 were assumed to
continue.
CThe 1980 national forecast is based upon the median case found in Gordon, R. L., "Analysis of Future Demand for Crude Oil," appendix C, part 1, An Analysis of the Economic
and Security Aspects of the Trans Alaska Pipeline. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Interior, December 1971. The middle case assumes an average annual rate of nearly 5% per
year and a compound exponential rate of 3.8% per year. The latter was used to estimate
the 1975 levels of consumption.
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Appendix C
Derivation of Regional Supply Schedules*
National
A Quantity
A Price

CTF
(1 2.7-9.7)MMb/d
($3.50-$2.50)

IPAA
= (13.5-8.0)MMb/d
($3.50-$2.50)

300,000b/d

550,000b/d
100

10
Average of IPAA and CTF

(550,000b/d + 300,O00b/d)/2
10€
100

=

425,000b/d
l0€

Regional
1970 Production
National = 11,335,000 b/d
District V = 1,304,000 b/d
District I-IV = 10,031,000 b/d
Percent District V =

1.304 MMb/d
11.335 MMb/d

= .115

Percent District I-IV = 10.031 = .885
11.335
Slope District V = .115 (425,000b/d/100) - 50,000b/d/100
Slope District I-IV = .885 (425,000 b/d/100) - 375,000 b/d/104
1970 Market Equilibrium
District V
Price = $3.43 per barrel
Quantity = 1.95 MMb/d
Domestic Quantity = 1.5 MMb/d
Districts I-IV
New York
Average Price
Quantity
Domestic Quantity
Supply Price
SP
b
a

=

=
=

District V
bv

Chicago

Gulf

46%(4.14) + 32% (3.89) + 22%(3.55) = $3.93 per barrel
12.8 MMb/d
9.8 MMb/d
a + b (Quantity Supplied)
a + b (QS)
slope
1970 Equilibrium Price - b (Equilibrium Quantity)
10.
=
1/ A Quantity = A Price
A Quantity 50,000 b/d
A Price
$1 I0
500,000b/d

av

(1,500,000b/d)

= $.43

District V Supply Schedule
Supply Price V

=

.43 -

1
Quantity Supplied
500,000b/d

July 19731

MANDA TOR Y OIL IMPORT QUOTA PROGRAM

429

Districts I-IV
100
=
Price
Quantity
375,000b/d

bi-IV
al-IV

$3.93 -

=

$1
3,750,000b/d

(9,800,000) = $1.32

District I-IV Supply Schedule:
Supply Price I-IV = 1.32 -

1
Quantity Supplied
3,750,000

*Joint Economic Committee, supra, November 3, 1971. The regional estimates in this table
are based on an assumption that the elasticity of supply of petroleum is the same in all
regions of the country. IPAA is the Independent Petroleum Association of America. CTF is
the Cabinet Task Force.
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Appendix D
Estimating The Average Real Resource Costs of a Barrel
of Crude Oil in 1970*
(Millions of dollars)
I.

Exploration
Development
Production
Overhead
Total

$2,287
2,631
3,236
825
$8,979

Less Production
Taxes

-857
$8,122

Add 10% Opportunity
Cost of Capital
Total Costs
II.

+812
$8,934

Annual average daily production

11.3MMb/da
x 365 days
4.125 billion barrels

Ill.

Allocation of total cost of oil and gas production to oil
High oil cost caseb
Average Cost per
Barrel of Oil

Low oil cost casec

= .875($8934 million)
4.125 billion
barrels

Approximate Average
Cost Per Barrel of
Oil

$1.90

.65 ($8934 million)
4.125 billion
barrels
$1.40

*Source of cost data is: American Petroleum Institute, et al Joint Association Survey of the
U.S. Oil and Gas ProducingIndustry, Washington, D.C., November 1971.
a1970 domestic production data is found in tables 2 and 3 above.
bSplitting cost of production in the ratio of 7 to 1 for oil to gas was suggested to me as an
industry rule of thumb by C. S. Overmiller, Chief Economist for Humble Oil and Refining
Company, Houston, Texas.
cSplitting cost of oil and gas 65% oil and 35% gas is based upon an assumption made in a
Joint Economic Committee Background Study, JEC, supra, November 3, 1971.

